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This article argues that the chief challenge to international governance is an emerging political 
cleavage, which pits nationalists against immigration, free trade, and international authority. 
While those on the radical left contest international governance for its limits, nationalists reject 
it in principle. A wide-ranging cultural and economic reaction has reshaped political conflict in 
Europe and the United States and is putting into question the legitimacy of the rule of law 










This paper builds on the Tallberg and Zürn approach to international legitimacy. Our argument 
is that a major policy shift from the early 1990s, which strengthened international 
organizations, has unleashed a delegitimating reaction in western societies. This targets some 
of the most prominent international organizations (IOs) directly, and has the more general 
effect of structuring domestic contestation around the very existence of rule-based 
international governance. 
 There is broad recognition that international governance is under stress. The 
predominant axis of debate hinges on whether the current international order will be 
undermined by rising nations as the hegemony of the United States (US) weakens. 
Constructivists engage this question by stressing the normative challenge that these states pose 
to western-dominated, rule-based, institutions (Acharya 2014). Neorealists predict a turbulent 
end to Pax Americana as the United States declines economically and militarily.1 Institutionalists 
point to the illiberal turn in rising nations and their attempts to project counter-norms 
(Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016). Those who disagree argue that rising nations will seek to 
reform, rather than eliminate, international governance. Writing in 2015, Ikenberry maintains 
that the liberal order will outlive US hegemony because it benefits rising as well as western 
states, and so what we are witnessing is “a crisis of the American governance of liberal order 
and not of the liberal order itself. The crisis of liberalism today will ultimately bring forth ‘more 
liberalism’” (Ikenberry 2010: 509; Ikenberry 2015; see also Kahler 2013). 
Our contribution in this commentary is to examine the character and implications of 
domestic political contestation. This special issue is a valuable point of departure because it 
asks us to move beyond the interaction of states to engage the perceptions of actors regarding 
the legitimacy of IOs.2 The perspective it advances has the potential to build a vital bridge 
between the study of international organization and the field of comparative politics. However, 
we wish to broaden the approach taken in the special issue. Our premise is that international 
governance is now embedded in partisan conflict, and that its future depends on the 
mobilization of that conflict in the contest for control over national governments. To 
understand the future of international governance one must pay attention to the ideologies of 
political leaders and political parties.3  
 Recent research in comparative politics reveals that attitudes towards immigration, 
trade-exacerbated inequality, and loss of national sovereignty have gained greatly in salience 
                                                                    
1 Layne (2012) argues that China’s views on international order are incompatible with those of the 
United States. Kissinger (2014) warns that unipolarism will be replaced by competition between four 
regional blocks with incompatible worldviews: European post-Westphalian, Islamic, Chinese, and 
American.  
2 See especially Anderson, Bernauer, and Kachi (2019); and Schmidtke (2019). 
3 We understand ideology in a broad sense as a set of normative beliefs and values about the proper 
order of society and how it can be brought about (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009: 309). 
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over the past decade.4 In Europe, a new cleavage has emerged which has as its core a political 
reaction against European integration and immigration (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi et al. 
2006; Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2016). The key issues relate to the defense of national 
community against transnational shocks. In the United States, the reaction against immigration, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and globalization has intensified 
partisanship, corroded democratic norms, and led to the election of a president deeply critical 
of IOs. Public opinion research reveals that immigration, trade and the perceived decline of US 
dominance are significant drivers of support for Donald J. Trump (Autor et al. 2017; Ballard-
Rosa et al. 2018; Cerrato, Ferrara, and Ruggieri 2018; Jensen et al. 2017; Mutz 2018).  
This suggests that international governance is challenged from within its democratic 
core as well as beyond it.5 To understand the tensions arising from internationalism, we need to 
broaden our point of view beyond relations among countries to conflict within them. Ironically, 
the most acute threat to international governance stems not from its inability to serve non-
Western countries, but from its perceived failure to help large numbers of voters at home.   
The point of departure for the contemporary crisis of legitimacy of international 
governance is a series of major reforms in the early 1990s that reduced barriers to 
transnational economic exchange. The 1990s were at the cusp of a rapid increase in 
international trade, international migration, and economic inequality that have their ideological 
roots in the Thatcher-Reagan years. The dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989 released more 
than one hundred million people to trade and circulate within the European Union (EU). The 
World Trade Organization (1994) was negotiated in the early 1990s, as were regional trade 
organizations, now totaling thirty-five in number (Hooghe et al. 2017). NAFTA (1992) was 
intended to eliminate trade and investment barriers in North America. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1993), negotiated in the early 1990s, extended EU authority over wide ranges of public life, 
made it much easier for people to work in another EU country, created a common currency, 
and turned nationals into European Union citizens. The 1990s saw a marked increase in 
delegation to international organizations beyond the European Union. Around four in five 
regional IOs have seen an increase in delegation to non-state bodies since their founding.  
The net effect of this institutional creativity has been to diminish the cost of 
international trade and migration while diffusing authority from central states to bodies within 
and among them. This involved the creation and empowerment of IOs—formally constituted 
rule-based institutions with an ongoing capacity for problem solving. IOs rest on agreement 
among member states, but to some extent all pool authority among states in majoritarian 
                                                                    
4 On Europe, see Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2014); De Vries (2018); Häusermann and Kriesi 
(2015); Rydgren (2013); Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde (2014); Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and van der Brug 
(2016). On Brexit, see Hobolt (2017); Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley (2018). 
5 Our argument highlights nationalist mobilization in the liberal heartland as the chief source of 
instability, but this is compounded by opposition from rising powers and authoritarian rulers. Rising 
powers may challenge IO governance because it reflects the interests and norms of its Western 
founders. Authoritarian rulers may reject IO authority because it queries their hold on power. 
Interestingly, challenges from rising powers or from authoritarian rulers are also often couched in a 
nationalist rhetoric.  
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decision making and delegate authority to independent non-state actors, including secretariats 
and courts. The institutionalization of international governance sought to impose the rule of 
law on relations that were previously determined by power.6 This provided a basis for 
cooperation in lowering the barriers to transnational exchange. Yet, the unintended 
consequence was to bring transnational exchange and international governance into domestic 
politics. 
In the next section, we outline key insights and shortcomings of the Tallberg and Zürn 
model of legitimacy and legitimation. The following section builds on this to compare the 
opposition of radical leftists and radical nationalists to IOs. The thrust of our argument is that 
even if some IOs are more directly targeted than others, the liberal world order that matured in 
the past two decades is now fundamentally contested. 
 
Ideological Conflict in the Tallberg-Zürn Framework 
Tallberg and Zürn adopt a sociological perspective in the tradition of Max Weber which 
conceives legitimacy as the “beliefs of audiences that an IO’s authority is appropriately 
exercised” (Tallberg and Zürn 2019: 4). Legitimacy is understood as a motivational force for 
rule-following and social order that rests on moral obligation that is distinct from both self-
interest and coercion. In the words of Tallberg and Zürn, legitimacy requires a “reservoir of 
confidence in an institution that is not dependent on short-term satisfaction with its 
distributional outcomes” (Tallberg and Zürn 2019: 11). By stressing perceptions of international 
authority, this sociological perspective puts the spotlight on why and when actors believe that 
they are morally obliged to obey (Tallberg and Zürn 2019: 4; see also Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-
Ehrhardt 2012; Zürn 2018; Lenz and Viola 2017). This has the virtue of problematizing both 
instrumental and expressive sources of IO support and opposition.7   
Tallberg and Zürn argue that the legitimacy of an IO depends on how it is designed, how 
it makes decisions, and what those decisions are. Hence, the framework gives analytical 
primacy to the IO itself: the scope and depth of its authority; its inclusiveness, transparency, 
and representativeness; how efficient, effective, and fair it is in carrying out its tasks. These 
evaluations depend on an actor’s cognitive and affective priors. The public, alongside NGOs, the 
media, and elites, rely on shortcuts in assessing the legitimacy of an IO’s authority, procedures, 
and performance.  
This analytical framework is carried forward in the contributions to this special issue. 
Anderson, Bernauer, and Kachi (2019) show that citizens’ legitimacy perceptions of global 
governance institutions are shaped by procedural and performance quality. Schmidtke (2019) 
                                                                    
6 The rule of law was long alien to international relations. The first time that the UN Security Council 
expressly made reference to the principle was in 1996 (Bingham 2010: 117; see also Alvarez 2005).  
Beginning in the 1990s, International Relations scholars developed new concepts to come to grips with 
this development: legalization (Goldstein et al. 2000), institutional design (Koremenos, Lipson, and 
Snidal 2001), and judicialization (Romano, Alter, and Shany 2014). 
7 See the 2005 IO special issue on international institutions and socialization which problematized how 
agents’ priors constrain international socialization (Checkel 2005).  
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focuses on public interest groups, finding that elite cues are most intense for IOs exerting 
extensive authority. Nielson, Hyde, and Kelley (2019) evaluate the legitimacy of election 
observers in the eyes of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and find that the important 
factor is experience.   
Can one generalize about how actors arrive at affective and cognitive shortcuts? An 
extensive literature highlights the way in which ideology structures opinions over political 
objects. Tallberg and Zürn provide an opening in this direction when they write that “IO 
legitimacy is … formed in a context of societal norms about the appropriate exercise of 
authority ... [L]egitimation as a process of justification and contestation intended to shape such 
beliefs” (Tallberg and Zürn 2019: 12, 4, our emphasis). In the language of the special issue, can 
one generalize about the societal norms that frame actors’ beliefs about the appropriate 
exercise of authority?  
Domestic Contestation about International Governance  
Counter-movements of leftists and nationalists have been at the forefront in challenging the 
legitimacy of IOs.8 Opposition began on the left, though in most recent years it been strongest 
among nationalists who frame their opposition to international governance as defense of the 
nation against transnational influences, above all immigrants. 
The leftist critique of international governance contains multiple strands, including a 
trade unionist component; a radical leftist strand with ties to participatory democracy, 
feminism, and the rights of indigenous peoples; a green or environmentalist component; and, 
around its edges, diverse groups with anarchist leanings.9 From the early 1970s, a coalition 
formed among these groups to oppose trade deals on the ground that economic integration in 
a world of segmented sovereignty would make governments subservient to the power of 
capital. The fear was that competition among governments for footloose capital would weaken 
unions, outflank environmental legislation, and undermine democracy.10  
This has motivated leftist opposition to several regional IOs, including NAFTA. Fears of 
job loss, rising inequality, and downward pressure on environmental and health standards were 
intensified because NAFTA insulated trade from social, welfare, and environmental concerns 
                                                                    
8 This argument builds on a growing literature that investigates the politicization of IOs. See e.g. 
Conceição-Heldt (2013); Ecker-Ehrhardt (2014); Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 
(2019); Hurrelmann and Schneider (2015); Kay (2015); Mansfield and Mutz (2012); Morgenstern et al. 
(2007); Rathbun (2012); Rixen and Zangl (2013); Zürn (2004); Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012). 
9 For exhaustive discussions of the global justice movement which comprises these strands, see 
Baumgarten (2017); Della Porta (2007); Smith et al. (2016). For discussions of the left’s mobilization to 
build a social Europe, see Hooghe and Marks (1999); Rhodes and van Apeldoorn (1997); Ross (1995). 
10 Anderson, Bernauer, and Kachi (2019) find that the second-most important reason why survey 
respondents in Germany and the United States perceive a hypothetical Global Climate Conference to be 
undemocratic is because they fear that business interests dominate negotiations. 
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(Schimmelfennig et al. 2018).11 In the European Union, radical left parties in Greece, Spain, 
France, and Germany have been sharply critical of EU-coordinated austerity in the wake of the 
Euro-crisis, and have demanded counter-measures, including European bonds, tighter EU 
regulation of banks, and a larger EU budget (Tsoukalis 2014; Varoufakis 2017). In Mercosur, 
trade unions and civil society organizations have been skeptical about the IO’s focus on trade 
liberalization (Grugel 2007; Olivet and Brennan 2010). A diverse leftist coalition, including the 
Inter-American Regional Organization for Workers and the Hemispheric Social Alliance 
alongside leftist governments, blocked a US-supported Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
because it did not encompass social policy or social rights (Briceño Ruiz 2007). Civil society 
groups made similar objections to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Spalding 2007).  
Leftist opposition has also targeted global IOs. In Fall 1999, tens of thousands of activists 
chanting “no globalization without representation!” broke up a ministerial WTO meeting in 
Seattle (Munck 2007: 60). Jay Mazur, president of the American Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), saw this as a turning point: “The era of trade 
negotiations conducted by sheltered elites balancing commercial interests behind closed doors 
is over” (Mazur 2000: 79). A transnational “Teamster-Turtle” Alliance of organized labor, 
environmentalists, community groups, and anti-capitalist youth demanded that liberalization 
be coupled with labor rights, fair wages, and environmental standards. In Kaldor’s (2000) 
memorable phrase this is a call to “civilize globalization.”  
These examples reveal that the left coalition does not reject international authority in 
principle. The most vocal leftist opponents of trade liberalization are ardent supporters of a 
more social, liberal, green, and democratic international organization (Burgoon 2009; Caporaso 
and Tarrow 2009). The slogan of the Global Justice Movement is “Another World is Possible,” 
an explicit refutation of Margaret Thatcher’s “There is no Alternative” (to neoliberal free trade) 
(Baumgarten 2017: 647). This is a demand for more, rather than less, international authority 
(Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O’Brien et 
al. 2000; Simmons 2009; Steger and Wilson 2012; Tarrow 2005). The movement for a “social 
Europe” was expressed in the demand for empowering the European Parliament, for greater 
redistribution, and for EU-wide social regulation. In Latin America, opponents of the US-led 
FTAA and the “Washington Consensus” sought to deepen Mercosur and the Andean 
Community as a countervailing force. International authority itself was not contested—its 
scope, depth, and form were. 
This cannot be said of radical nationalists. President Trump, Marine Le Pen and the 
French National Rally, Matteo Salvini and the Northern League in Italy, and Geert Wilders and 
the Party for Freedom and Progress in the Netherlands reject international organization in 
principle as well as in practice. In a speech launching her campaign for the 2017 presidential 
race, Le Pen made globalization the enemy, linking it to Islamist fundamentalism as a force that 
will “subjugate our country” and “make our nation disappear.” Le Pen promised to pull France 
out of the Eurozone, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, more generally, regain 
                                                                    
11 At the eleventh hour, the Clinton administration secured two side accords custom-tailored to allay 
particular US environmental and labor concerns (Morgenstern et al. 2007). For an astute analysis of the 
politics surrounding the genesis and development of NAFTA, see Bow and Santa Cruz (2015).  
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“our territorial sovereignty.” President Trump is similarly committed to regaining national 
sovereignty, and has openly questioned the rule of international law in a speech to the Central 
Intelligence Agency in which he suggested that the spoils of war belong to the victor.12 In its 
first two years of office, the Trump administration has pulled the United States out of the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement, withdrawn from the United Nations Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, reigned in legal and illegal immigration from non-Western countries, and 
renegotiated NAFTA. 
The radical nationalist reaction to international governance is sharply different from the 
neoliberal critique that gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s. While neoliberals opposed 
broadly authoritative international governance, they supported IOs, including NAFTA and the 
EU, to achieve market deregulation and limited government.13 Along these lines, British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher championed the European single market project and opposed 
overarching regulation. In her speech at the College of Europe in 1988, she declared “the need 
for [European] Community policies which encourage enterprise” and for “removing barriers to 
trade … in the multilateral negotiations in the GATT,” but she saw no further role for EU 
institutions: “we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to 
see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European superstate.”  
Recent comparative research suggests that today the delegitimation of IOs is more than 
a clash of policies. It appears to be part of a new social cleavage that is transforming the 
structure of conflict, pitting cultural and economic losers of transnationalism against the 
winners. Many feel left behind by an economic and cultural transformation that has diminished 
the protective capacity of the nation state (Hochschild 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
National borders have been perforated by immigration, international trade, and in Europe, by 
the melding of states in a multilevel polity.  
This transnational cleavage is independent of conventional left-right conflict about the 
role of government and welfare. At the nationalist pole are those who want to defend “national 
political, social and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by 
migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule.” At the cosmopolitan pole are those who 
conceive their national identity as consistent with international governance and who welcome, 
rather than oppose, the dense interpenetration of societies (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 2).  
                                                                    
12 “When I was young, we were always winning things in this country. We'd win with trade. We'd win 
with  wars. At a certain age, I remember hearing from one of my instructors, "The United States has 
never lost a war." And then, after that, it's like we haven’t won anything. We don’t win anymore. The old 
expression, "to the victor belong the spoils" -- you remember. I always used to say, keep the oil. I wasn’t 
a fan of Iraq. I didn’t want to go into Iraq. But I will tell you, when we were in, we got out wrong. And I 
always said, in addition to that, keep the oil.” Full text: Trump, Pence remarks at CIA Headquarters on 
January 23, 2017: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cia-speech-transcript/ 
13 Neoliberal ideas on international authority were influential in the structural adjustment programs of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s, the creation of the World 
Trade Organization in 1995, and the phenomenal rise in preferential trade agreements in the 1990s 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1992). 
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The roots of this cleavage reach into social structure. Nationalists and cosmopolitans are 
sharply distinguished by gender, occupation, rural-urban location, and above all, by education 
(Golder 2016; Marks et al. 2018; Van Elsas, Hakhverdian, van der Brug 2016). Nationalist parties 
are composed disproportionately of white working men who perceive loss of status 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2018; Marks et al. 2018; Mutz and Kim 2017). Many white Americans 
are anxious about their oncoming minority status and fear the erosion of US hegemony (Mutz 
2018: 2-3). Individuals with lower subjective social status are significantly more likely to believe 
that immigrants take jobs away from the native born and that their country should limit 
imports (Gidron and Hall 2017: 70-72). The Brexit vote has a similar structure. Leavers tend to 
have strongly unfavorable opinions on immigration, multiculturalism, and globalization, and to 
feel that they suffer both culturally and economically from the exercise of international 
governance. 
 
The Constraints of Domestic Contestation on IO Governance 
The contrasting stances of nationalist and radical left political parties can be gauged with 
original data. Figure 1 depicts the ideological positions of 191 political parties in fourteen EU 
member states between 1999 and 2017. The X-axis represents the median level of support 
among nationalist, radical left, and green parties for internal market liberalization, European 
integration, and a range of EU market-correcting policies. Both the median nationalist party and 
radical left party oppose Europe’s internal market, but they have sharply different views on EU 
institutions and market-correcting policies. Nationalist parties oppose Europe across the board, 
whereas the radical left would like to see more, not less, supranationalism. Nationalist and 
radical left political parties have consistently divergent attitudes on the European parliament’s 
powers, employment policy, environmental policy, and asylum policy. In this field, to reverse 
the classic expression, the extremes do not touch.   
The slogan of the European-wide association of radical left parties in the 2014 European 
parliamentary elections was “Escaping Austerity, Rebuilding Europe.” Its manifesto rejected 
nationalism and ethnocentrism. Nationalist parties, by contrast, see the EU as a threat to 
national community as well as a source of economic insecurity. In the March 2018 national 
elections, the Italian Northern League competed on the slogan “Slaves of Europe? No, thanks!” 
Both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump rejected NAFTA during the 2016 presidential campaign, 
but in contrasting ways. Donald Trump claimed he would raise tariffs unilaterally and tear up 
trade agreements, while Bernie Sanders said he would honor existing deals as he renegotiated 
them (Carter 2016). 
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Figure 1: Contesting Europe: Breakdown by policy and party group 
 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data on the positioning of national political parties on EU policies (Polk et al. 
2017). Each item ranges from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor). Median expert assessments across six 
time points (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2017) for fourteen EU member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, UK). Nationalist parties 
(N=61), radical left parties (N=79), green parties (N=51) that obtained at least 2 percent of the vote in the most 
recent national election prior to the time point of evaluation. Data available from: https://www.chesdata.eu/ 
 
Interestingly, green parties, which are sometimes placed under the radical left umbrella, favor 
internationalization across the board, though they are less enthusiastic on the internal market 
than on European integration more generally. In recent years, green parties have become 
outspoken advocates of transnationalism. Support for international institutions, particularly IOs 
with a capacity to regulate economic activity beyond the national state, is integral to their 
political program.  
Whereas nationalists reject international governance because it undermines state 
sovereignty, those on the left evaluate an IO in light of its potential for social regulation. The 
contrast between the EU and NAFTA is a case in point. The European Union is a general purpose 














































specific IO with a policy portfolio that is limited to free trade.14 The appeal of a general purpose 
IO such as the European Union is that, unlike NAFTA, it holds the promise of regulating 
powerful economic interests and of redistributing from rich to poor regions. The fact that the 
EU has a directly elected parliament underpins this potential (Rocabert et al. 2019).  
Several IOs have sought to respond to the criticisms of the radical left by enhancing 
participation and transparency and, to some extent, by engaging regulatory issues beyond 
trade and investment. IOs have opened channels to social groups, created consultative bodies 
of parliamentarians, and strengthened access for civil society stakeholders (Tallberg et al. 2013; 
Rocabert et al. 2019). This has gone hand in hand with democratic rhetoric and transparency 
(Dingwerth et al. 2015; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2017). Several IOs have made an effort to incorporate 
social, cultural, and other non-economic concerns in trade and investment. In the early 2000s, a 
US-French proposal, backed by the European Parliament, sought to include labor standards in 
the WTO. The proposal was defeated, but “the Marrakesh meeting gave the trade union drive 
for enforceable ‘international worker rights standards’ far greater credibility” (French 2002: 
286) and spawned a round of pre-emptive legitimation including a World Bank publication, 
Workers in an Integrating World, and the UN’s Global Compact (Higgott 2000).15 Latin American 
regional organizations have adopted a social, educational, and cultural agenda (Ribeiro 
Hoffmann 2015: 64).  
It is vastly more difficult for IOs to respond to criticism from radical nationalists. 
Nationalists aim their sharpest barbs at general purpose IOs because they are the nearest thing 
in the international domain to government, the exercise of authority across a wide, 
incompletely contracted, policy field on behalf of a transnational community. General purpose 
IOs are anathema for those who conceive national identity in zero-sum terms. To the extent 
that task-specific IOs exert supranational authority, they too weaken control over the nation’s 
destiny. Le Pen wants France to leave the military structure of NATO as well as the European 
Union, and for the same reason: “so that France would not be dragged in wars that are not its 
own.” 
Conclusion  
We are witnessing unprecedented opposition to post-war international governance in its 
heartland: Europe and the United States. In this commentary, we suggest that IO legitimacy is 
embedded in ideological contestation. When viewed from this angle, some striking 
developments come into view. IOs have served as the basis for the international order 
                                                                    
14 It is doubtful whether NAFTA’s successor, the recently concluded US-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA), can be categorized as an international organization, “a formal organization for collective 
decision making constituted by three or more states … structured by rules for a continuous purpose” 
(Hooghe et al. 2017: 14-15). A sunset clause triggers automatic expiration after sixteen years unless 
formally renewed by the three parties.  
15 Global Compact, written under the guidance of John Gerald Ruggie, was announced by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan in his Address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Jan 31, 1999 
(Press Release SG/SM/6881).  
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following World War Two. Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—were responsible for 
maintaining a stable world economy based on the principle of non-discrimination in an effort to 
avoid mutually exclusive economic blocs and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The system also 
legitimated economic intervention at the national level—a grand political bargain that Ruggie 
(1982) termed “embedded liberalism.” 
After the Cold War this bargain was recast in a wave of institutional reform that 
facilitated international economic exchange and migration by empowering IOs that extended 
the rule of law among states. Contrary to the era of embedded liberalism, this new 
international order gave states much less discretion for shielding their populations from the 
insecurities of transnationalism. International governance succeeded in diminishing the cost of 
exchange across national borders, and its aggregate effect was to increase human welfare. 
However, it has generated a profound cultural and economic reaction in the states that 
launched the reforms. The debate over international governance features prominently in party-
political programs; it influences national elections; and it is reshaping the structure of political 
conflict in Europe and the United States. Beyond the characteristics of individual IOs, there 
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